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OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
OF UTAH,
Pfointiff-Respondent.
VS.

.\IWHAEL DALE GILL,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.
11783

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE
The appellant was convicted by a jury of the crime of
,·nbber)' in the District Court of the Third Judicial District,
Count:-' of Salt Lake, State of Utah, the Honorable Merrill
C. Faux. Judge, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
->

The appellant was tried and convicted of robbery June
1
and -subsequently sentenced to an indeterminate

term in the Utah State Prison.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent prays thi-s Court will affirm the action
r1f the trial court below.

2
STATE.\IE:\'T OF THE FACTS
The i·espondent wish L'S to make his

0\111

,

the facts notwithstanding- tlw statement madt- I>:. il\l!H'!i;i:,:
on pag:es 2 through ;->of his b1·ief.
On Novembe!' 1, 19()1, Barman's Take-Honie (';u 1
located in Salt Lake

l 1tah, was rnblied by two mei.

( T. 6-K). Mal"ilyn l\larx, rnanage1· of Harman's, was pre<-

ent during· the robbe1»· ( T. 1)-K),

;l's

\\'as

Kimbal;

( T. G). Subsequt•ntl,1, i\Ja!'i\.\·11 l\Iarx was taken bl ;\ lineu1:

and

identified the appellant as thL' one having

committed the crime ( T. 1:1-11); ho\\'e\'el', such identification was not ente1·ecl as evidenc:e lJ.Y the Stall•_
at trial,

Sulio;•_·-

Mmx made an in-cumt identifi-

cation of the appelhnt based on he1· recollection uf th('
appellant during the c·ommission of the alleged crime 1 T.
:)-12) as clid She1·y\ Kimball (T. 24-25). l\Ioreover, Lind;:

Fehmal, who arlmittecl lwing «n access01·y to the crime IT.
28-:1:1), also identified the appellant as the perpetrntor 1T.

:2K-:1:3). Afte1· all the evirlence had been presented and the
instn1c:ted. a \'erdic:t of g·uilt>' was i·etunwd li, thf

( T. 1-g).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IK PREY ENTIN G CROSS-EXAMINATION WHICH
\VAS IRRELEVENT TO THE ISSUES BEFORE
THE COURT.

Th\ :1ppr·lLrnt c11 ntr·nds th:tt he· 11':\'s prr•judicc-d l>ecallM'
,,;JllS(•]

,I

it ;tl'.,1,', l'd

.·,\ • ll

c!l

c·(,,o·,..;-l'Xamine ;, jll'OSl'C:Ulioll

..... !., 1·;:_\ n :1L:rx. :t.-. t11 t:1,· cii'n1m.-;tann's su1Tound1!Jl•'ll!l ! Olldlid<.•d pl'io1· to lilt' tl'ial. Ile i't11·ther l'Oll-

'I' tl1:1.t >t1«h c1'11:--. ;-t•x:1rnination \\·a:' prllpel' a ...; a nwarh
. '. ::1;..o till ll'!•dihilit:: of the witness's sulisPqUPnt in-

·,!, 11c!t'i(;1tion :rnd that thP cotllt erred when it sus:.11·1,·il th1• p1·osP«t1tion's ol>.iediun to sud1

tll:\t it \1·;,s irn•k\·ant and

th(·

<:1 <111

011hid,.

thl'

" 'I•· "'

Tlw n·sp\!n1:Pnt admits that cross-examination of a
·: ;ws-;

is :1 111,tt,•;·

\ ·. ;.; 1:.'\I (
1:1

<

11f

1·ig:ht. :1/tonf V. l'nit1·d Stall's,

:c!Hl that wiclt' latitude should be allowed

rns,'-'-(''\:1mination if such examination would elicit facts

r,.:t "1·11:.ild hPlp rnthcr than confuse the jury, Stat!' v. Day,

( >r. l'JX,

P.

:30 ( 1964). Howe\'<'!', the eourt

to )ll'l'mit questions on c1·os-s-examination where the

1
::1 ·

1rn:ation sought to be elicited is irrelevant, Gallegos v.
103 P. :Zd 864 ( 1965), cert. denied,

i'1r11J/1. 1.17 Colo.

1· S. 911, and \\·as not testified to on direct-examina-

:.i()n, Sta tr v. Sterens, 119 Mont. 169, 172 P. 2d 299 (1946) .
.\l 1rc·.•-.«'l'. it is the prerogati,·e of the trial court to decide
0

"' :.,•ti1t·1· 01· not such crnss-examination is proper or im-

:' ·11)1c'l". ,\'fate v. Anderson, 16 Wash. 2d 864, 285 P. 2d 879
: 1 '.i-,.-1). and, unless it can be shown that the court abused

•h;•t discretion, the ruling should not be disturbed on
'PJW<I l.

The dialogue
tppellant's brief.

111

question is quoted on pages 3-5 of

It can readily be seen that there were

011].\·

b\·o questi"ib \\·hich c1Jllll:>t•l !"or ;qipellant wa, ':

ptTmitted to ask. Boi.h of these qm\.."-tio11,; dealt with
1,r not the1·e wen.• any Mexi<:ans or Negroes in the lineur
which was conduct,'.'."\ pri•Jl' to trial; ht1\•:eve1·. th 1•
of

lineup never came in as evidence during the cour,,

of the trial. ::'-Jotwithstanding, the appellant contends that
he should have been allmYed to ask quc·stions as

t1)

nature of the lineup a·s a means to test tlw credibilit\
the witness's in-court idf'ntification oC the appelhmt.

th,
111

However, the in-court identification was not based on
the lineup; rather, it was based on the witness's rec:ollettion of the appellant du1·in51,· the commission of the allegt1i
rnbbery ( T. F>-1:2). The appellant contends. howeYer, that
the "·itness's 1·ecollection may have been tainted b.\· th ..
lineup, thus placing the credibility of the in-court identification in issue. Such a theo1·y of impeachment i1-> permissible under the law; howeve1-, it is the position of the re·
spondent that the appellant was afforded every legal ri;rht
to attempt impeachment based on that theory. The appellant was pe1·mitted to ask whethe1· or not there was a lineup
(T. 1:1) and whether 01· not the witness had been told thl
name of the appellant at the lineup (T. 13). 1VIoreme1". the
appellant was permitted to cross-examine as to whetht1
or not the witness knew the brother of the appellant, James
Gill ( T. 12. 18). Obviously, the thrnst of the questions
to show that the witness may have confused the appellant
with his brnthe1', James, and that had it not been for the
lineup, the in-court identification could not have been made.
The dialogue quoted on pages 3-:-) of appellant's brief sho\1 s

!

tlw ;qi1wllant 11·as

,,it

.

to

i ;,,11

.'H'l'.

Ill

fact gr::nlL"fl suffi<:il'nt ."c·o1w on

rnisL'

thl' impeachment inferencf'.

tlH·n· i;-; no basis on which one could argue that

...;ti<Jns ob.il'dect to, i.e., whether or not therP \\'ere

•J:,

\,"ci"lp-; r:r :\kxicans in the lineup, had an\ rele\'allc\ t(>
dwtlwr n1· n 1 >t the
had rnnfused the
of the
1:1pellant 11·itli his brother James. Such questions g-o to
the r" in ...; ti tutional validity of the lineup \\'hich wa:s not in
:-;:-,U«

in this case bet.:ause the in-court identification wa.-;

11"t L'11tPred <is evidence. l\IorP(Jver, such qu&<>tions had no

bearing

•Jll

the

of the witness's credibility. Clearly,

i:w questions were irrelevant and had no purpose other
than to rnni'use the .iurr and cloud the real issues before
th" court.

POINT II.
IF THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED ERROR

RESTRICTING THE SCOPE OF APPELRIGHT OF CROSS-EXAMINATION,
SlTH ERROR WAS HARMLESS AND IS NOT
GROl'NDS FOR REVERSAL.
l'tah Code Ann.§ 77-42-1 (195:1) provides:
"After having an appeal the court must give
judgment without regard to errors or defects which
do not affect the substantial rir1hts of the parties.
If error has been committed, it shaU not be presumed to have rC'Sulted in prejudice. The court
must l>e satisfied that it has that effect before it
is warranted in reversing the judgment." ( Emphasis added.)
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T1i,. 1n·i1w1plv-; , il1:J()di1·d i11

cu l'

ll t

l ' , ll st it u

1i a I

Lt\\ .

"

·'

<

t

l

·11·

'

·

'.' 111 <llCIJI'(

l

i\'!1.:

111 ('ha JJ Iii an v. ('al /j 0 , n ir• .. ,
l,

Supreme Court
that er!·1n· "h.;nni1·,;,; iw,l'<>lHI a reasonable doubt," frJ.
t ·. S. 1;-; ( I

:.! l. i,; iwl
d1'al;

i\

.,,

t

tlw l '11ited ::-;tat\.':;

J.!,'i'()lllld,;

fo1·

i'<'\

u·,;a]

L'Yen

ith ('(>lL-;tituti.,n;d rig),ts. nast>cl

tl1is Cm.rt in :. .·t11i1 v .. 1111/e1.'w11,

()I)

if tht.• allegeii
!)Jl

Uwse

;:·

l'JI.,

jJl'llll'i!Jlt·

Cbh 0:->1, :..'.-)] l' .. ;.;

( l 'l:!ti) .,.iid 1J:1 tllv is.;u1• o:· imprnper l'l'\JSs-ex;1111inatiun:

"Conceding· that it is Jl()t p1·01w1· to ;i,;l: ;1 , it·
ne.ss, either on direct 01· U'<l'Ss-examination, tu 1,;'-"
sure thP testimony of othe1· witnesses, still. 111 ,.,,,,.
of the IP hole 1·eco1 d in th is case, the
aske,l
and the answers given could, in no w;1y, be preii111icial to appellant." (Emphasis added.) :2:'d !'. ;.i
:363.
Althoug-h the Andenwn case dealt with qU6Stions asked un
cross-examination which were imprnperly allowed as
tinguished frnm the instant case where the questions \\'er,
not pei-mitte<l, the principle is the same, i.e., unless the
appellant can sho\\ S!lbstantial prejudice in 1·ir11· of t/11
ll'hole rcr·ord. due to the alleged enor, he is not entitled

t1,

a 1·even;al.
The 1·espon<lent submits, in view of the whole reconl,

appellant's rights we1·e not substantially preju-

diced. It is clear that appellant's
was that 1Iarilyn
Marx had mistaken James Gill, the brother of the appellant, for the appellant himself. Based on this theory, the
appellant \\"as able to cross-examine Marilyn Marx regartlinp: her knowledge of James Gill ( T. 12, 13). He thoroughly cro.-;s-ex:tmined her on her pPrceptivity of the event,;;

7
t:11· :li:, ;x:•d

,,:,

t·> iii.

i"'·
, ,1::

lTlLll'

(

'J'. l

;t,.;

ti•

lJt'I'

ph.\-.ical diff"1·l'lll'l'S lil't\\'c•1·n .Janws

ti:, :l!lpl'il::lit ( T.

·11.:

:tlld

L:th·r. thl' appl'llant

·, ..,":11.•d e\·irienc1· that in fact .Jam<'s Gill and not the
h;td <'1lillnitted thl· all<·ged rnliiwr_;· (T.

. •:"·:'. i:l

,, -. it
,

,

:'l'l'l11c-

11 :1!,Jt•

d<'ar t!;;1t ;1ppellant

\1·as ).'.T:rnted en•r\

L:tite1<k' to com·irn:e th(' .iur.\· ti1:1t .fames and
had rnmmitted tlw crinw.

It \1ould llf'

'ii!1g: 1·t•:1 ..;on to cone:ltale that the appellant \\'a.;; sub.-t.:11·,::d!_\ pn·.iudiced liec-: l!S<' tlw court denied him the
1

,

to

\1•;.:1"'''

:\Ia1·ilyn Marx if the1·e were '.\Iexieans or

;1..;k

in tlw lineup; especiall.\

Tllc• alle1rP<l
,11

Jln11;n!ffo>1

is this tn1p when the

is harmless on still another ground.
Ca.liforn:a, :19G lT. S.
(1969), the

<'l'l'OI'

V.

.. C()u1·t affinned the c01n-ic:tion of the appellant
''Li1·

1:1

tht• o\·p1·11·helming- evidenc:p against him notwithhis rnn•.'>titutional allegations of

·.t;:
:• -t:t;11.

C:<\St'.

PITOJ'.

In the

like in Han·inflf(Jn, the t•\·idenc:e of g-uilty

: 1i1 :-:t the appellant ts o\·erwhelming notll'ithstanding the
1

ll":'<Lt11,n that counsel for the appellant was improperly
liP1itv:i <ll1 his crnss-examination of :\Iarilyn ?lfarx.
_'.;;" \: dear!:· identified the app('llant as the one who comitted the: c:l'ime (T. 8. 9,
.1,

as did Sheryl Kimball (T.

another of the State's \\'itnesses, whose testimony

i:lc1dentall\· is not e:hallenged by the appellant. Moreover,
Linda Fehmal, a third State's witness. admitted being an
to the crime, and testified that the appellant
11 ;is

the pe1·petrator ( T. 28-33).

In ligi1t uf thl' h'stirnuil\- lwfon' the

.

1·u1·-_
'

\\·hic 1'1

1:..;• 1)r, •

challt'ng·pr[ \yy the appl'llant. it seems l·leal' that thl' evidr::ni·,

points to appellant's guilt beyond a rea.,;<,·'.alile doubt. Thus, c'ven though el'ror may have lwen cun;.
milted '>dwn couns1:'l for appellant c1·oss-examined :\Iarily1,

i\Iarx, in light of otht.'l' existing t.>vidence pointing to app\-':.
!ant's guilt, such l'!Tor is not grnunds for rever"'in;r
l'UJinµ: of the Jmn'I' COUit.

The l"c>spondent sulm1its that the lower court did

11 .. 1_

abuse its disc1·etion in not allowing- certain questions proffered by appellant's counsel during the cross-examination
of .'.\Iarilyn Marx; but, if this Court fin<ls that in fact such
limitation was enor, then the respondent submits that such
enor was harmless and thus not grounds fo1· reversing the
court below.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROl\'INEY
Attorney General

LAUREN N. BEASLEY

Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Rrspondn11

